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I. IN RE LANDMARK LAND CO.: A LANDMARK ROADBLOCK FOR
BANKRUPTCY COURTS V. FEDERAL REGULATORS?
In Landmark Land Co. v. Resolution Trust Corp. (In re Landmark Land
Co.)' the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the lower federal district
court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to enjoin the Resolution Trust
Corporation ("RTC"), acting as conservator of a failed thrift, from exercising
its ownership rights over the thrift's bankrupt subsidiaries. The decision
essentially precludes any interference with the RTC's responsibility of
resolving failed thrifts, including control over a failed thrift's principal assets
(its bankrupt subsidiaries), and reveals the court's view on whether companies
owned by thrifts may seek protection in bankruptcy not only from private
creditors, but also from government regulators.
In Landmark, Oak Tree Savings Bank, S.S.B. ("Oak Tree") was the sole
shareholder of Clock Tower Place Investments, Ltd., ("Clock Tower") which
owned all of the stock in five Landmark Land companies. 2 On October 11,
1991, Clock Tower and its asset-rich subsidiaries (collectively with Clock
Tower, the "subsidiaries") filed petitions for relief under Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code. 3 On that same day the United States Bankruptcy Court for
the District of South Carolina issued, ex parte, a temporary restraining order
against Oak Tree prohibiting Oak Tree from exercising its right to call a
shareholders' meeting to elect new members to the subsidiaries' boards of
directors. Thus, the order prevented the Office of Thrift Supervision ("OTS")
from managing the thrift's principal assets-the subsidiaries. 4

1. 973 F.2d 283 (4th Cir. 1992).
2. The five subsidiary companies included: Landmark Land Co. of California, Inc.;
Landmark Land Co. of Carolina, Inc.; Landmark Land Co. of Florida, Inc.; Landmark Land Co.
of Louisiana, Inc.; and Landmark Land Co. of Oklahoma, Inc. Id. at 286n.1. These subsidiaries
developed, owned, and managed resort residential communities using the savings bank's lower
cost funds to finance their real estate investments. Early in 1991, these subsidiaries held
approximately $1 billion in real estate assets and millions more in "goodwill," once an accepted
asset. Sherry R. Sontag, Laws Are Colliding Over LitigationInvolving Thrift, Nat'l L.J., Dec.
16, 1991, at 15. The Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989
("FIRREA") nearly eliminated the capital value of goodwill and required that savings and loans
no longer tie up capital in real estate. Id. Forced to recapitalize, Oaktree suddenly found its
financial solvency deteriorating, and attempts to sell the subsidiaries did not meet regulatory
approval. Anticipating that regulators would seize the institution, Oaktree placed its asset-rich
subsidiaries under the protection of the bankruptcy court. Id.
3. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1330 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
4. In re LandmarkLand Co., 973 F.2d at 287.
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On October 13, 1991, the OTS appointed the RTC to act as receiver for
Oak Tree pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(2)(E). 5 The RTC organized, and
the OTS chartered, Oak Tree Federal Savings Bank ("Oak Tree Federal").
Pursuant to a purchase agreement, Oak Tree Federal purchased all of the
RTC's interest in Oak Tree's assets, including the wholly-owned subsidiaries.
After the OTS appointed the RTC as conservator for Oak Tree Federal, the
RTC immediately asked the district court to lift the temporary restraining
order to allow it to call a shareholders' meeting and exercise its ownership
rights over the subsidiaries. Concluding that the receivership powers of the
RTC do not divest a court of the power to protect the reorganization of
corporate entities under the Bankruptcy Code, the district court denied the
RTC's motion and converted the TRO into a preliminary injunction.6 The
RTC appealed the preliminary injunction, and the Fourth Circuit reversed and
remanded with instructions to dissolve the preliminary injunction.'
The Fourth Circuit framed the issue as "whether the district court has
jurisdiction to enjoin the RTC, acting as conservator of a failed thrift, from
assuming control of the thrift's subsidiaries that are under Chapter 11
protection of the bankruptcy court."' The court held that the district court
lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to enjoin the RTC from exercising its
ownership rights over Oak Tree Federal's wholly-owned subsidiaries.9
The court opined that Congress established within the Financial Institution
Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 ("FIRREA") ° a comprehensive statutory scheme granting the RTC broad powers to reorganize and
collect assets for the benefit of depositors and taxpayers." The court stated

5. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(2)(E) (Supp. IV 1992).
6. Landmark Land Co. v. ResolutionTrust Corp. (Inre Landmark Land Co.), 134 B.R. 557,
559 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1991), rev'd, 973 F.2d 283 (4th Cir. 1992). The district court anticipated
that the RTC intended to eventually sell the subsidiaries' assets to the detriment of other creditors.
Id. The RTC, as conservator for Oak Tree Federal, owed 91% of the debtors' consolidated debt.
The district court believed it had jurisdiction to avert "abuse of shareholder rights and to prevent
interference with the debtors' rights to reorganize." Id. at 559-60. Essentially the court believed
that allowing the RTC to control the reorganization would adversely affect the interests of other
creditors. Id. at 559. For instance, the court believed that retaining experienced management
would best protect the interests of the subsidiaries' other creditors because irreparable injury
would result if the court permitted the RTC to replace management. Id. at 560.
7. In re Landmark Land Co., 973 F.2d at 290.
8. Id. at 287.
9. Id. at 290.
10. Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989) (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
11. Upon its appointment as conservator or receiver, the RTC succeeds to "all rights, titles,
powers, and privileges of the insured depository institution,. . . and the assets of the institution."
12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(2)(A)(i) (Supp. IV 1992). The RTC's power to control an institution's
assets includes, but is not limited to, the power to "conduct all business of the institution,"
"perform all functions of the institution ... consistent with the appointment as conservator or
receiver," and "preserve and conserve the assets and property of such institution." Id.
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that "Congress made no provision for protecting some assets, such as
subsidiary corporations, from being controlled and/or disposed of as the RTC
deems necessary to maximize the return for depositors."12 The court
concluded that FIRREA clearly empowered the RTC to take any action
"'necessary to put the insured depository institution in a sound and solvent
condition.'"13
Proper resolution of this issue requires a careful reconciliation of Title 11
(the Bankruptcy Code) and Title 12 (the United States Code on Banks and
Banking, as recently amended by FIRREA). Section 105 of Title 11 clearly
states that a district court "may issue any order, process, or judgment that is
necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title." 14 Therefore, it would appear that this section gives the district court the authority to
protect the reorganization process through injunctive relief in the bankruptcy
context.
Title 11 and Title 12 evidence two separate statutory schemes to govern
insolvent corporate entities and financial institutions. The Bankruptcy Code
reserves to the district courts the jurisdiction to administer the reorganization
of corporations such as the bankrupt subsidiaries, yet excludes financial
institutions. 15 In contrast, Title 12, grants the RTC extensive authority to
manage the liquidation of insolvent savings and loan associations such as Oak
Tree.' 6 Further, the two statutory schemes serve different purposes. Chapter
11 allows the debtor the opportunity to reorganize its debt in order to continue
to operate. In contrast, Title 12 focuses on the RTC's responsibility not only
to manage insolvent thrifts, but also to operate them in a manner that
"maximizes the net present value return from the sale or other disposition of
institutions . . . or the assets of such institutions. "17
Congress made no express provision that Title 12 supersedes the district
court's jurisdiction over corporate debtors granted by Titles 11 and 28.
Further, Title 12 does not grant the RTC authority to act as conservator or
receiver for business corporations which, conceivably, include corporate
debtor subsidiaries of insolvent financial institutions.' 8 FIRREA repeatedly
refers to the "principal assets" of the failed institutions-language the RTC
emphasized encompasses any wholly-owned subsidiary. 9 Curiously, the
Fourth Circuit did not distinguish these two schemes, but instead appears to

§ 1821(d)(2)(B).
12. In re Landmark Land Co., 973 F.2d at 289.
13. Id. (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(2)(D) (Supp. IV 1992)).
14. 11 U.S.C. § 105 (1988).
15. Id. § 109(b).
16. See 12 U.S.C. § 1441a(b)(3) (Supp. IV 1992).
17. Id. § 1441a(b)(3)(C)(i).
18. Brief of Appellees at 27.
19. Brief of Appellant at 12.
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have taken a policy-driven approach. The court seemed convinced that both
the Congressional mandate and the national concern over the savings and loan
crisis warranted its decision.2
In Landmark, the Fourth Circuit declined to follow the reconciliation
offered in In re American Continental Corp.,21 concluding instead "the
American Continentalcourt interfered with legitimate statutory functions of the
RTC."' However, the factual similarities between American Continentaland
Landmark would appear to suggest a result different than that ultimately
reached by the Fourth Circuit.'
In American Continental the RTC, as
conservator of a failed thrift, moved for dismissal of the subsidiaries'
bankruptcy cases because of "pervasive conflicts" between Title 11 and Title
12.24 Initially, the American Continental court regarded two points as
significant. First, it noted that the subsidiaries were not financial institutions,
but rather were separate corporations eligible for protection under the
Bankruptcy Code. Second, the court noted that RTC was the conservator for
the failed thrift, but not for the subsidiaries. 25 The RTC was entitled to
direct the operations of the subsidiaries solely as a result of the thrift's status
as a shareholder. The court considered it pivotal that FIRREA neither
deprives a district court of jurisdiction over the RTC nor nullifies any
provision of the Bankruptcy Code. The court further noted that "Congress
could have specifically preempted application of Chapter 11 as to subsidiaries
of depository institutions regulated by Title 12, but it did not do so."26
Finally, the court recognized that subsidiaries of financial institutions do not

20. See In re Landmark Land Co., 973 F.2d at 289-90.
21. Ch. 7 Case No. B-89-3117 PHX-SSC, No. Civ. 89-1231 PHX-RMB (D. Ariz. Oct. 30,

1989).
22. In re LandmarkLand Co., 973 F.2d at 289.
23. In American Continentaleleven wholly-owned subsidiaries of Lincoln Savings and Loan
Association ("Lincoln") filed bankruptcy petitions under Chapter 11 on April 10, 1989. Four
days later the Federal Home Loan Bank Board ("FHLBB") placed Lincoln into conservatorship
and appointed the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation ("FSLIC") as conservator.
Three days later, FSLIC voted its 100% stock ownership in each subsidiary to establish new
boards of directors which in turn installed new management teams. Within a few months the
RTC succeeded FSLIC as receiver of the failed thrift and as conservator of the new federallychartered savings and loan association pursuant to FIRREA. In re American ContinentalCorp.,
slip op. at 1-2.
24. Similar to its position in Landmark, the RTC argued that the bankruptcy proceedings
would conflict irreconcilably with the statutory mandate of FIRREA that the RTC manage the
business of the institution and preserve and conserve its assets and property. Id. slip op. at 2.
The RTC concluded that the Bankruptcy Code may not affect in any manner its management of
a failed thrift's subsidiaries, "including dissolution of the subsidiaries or consolidation of their
assets." Id.
25. Id. slip op. at 3.
26. In re American ContinentalCorp., Ch. 7 Case No. B-89-3117 PHX-SSC, No. Civ. 891231 PHX-RMB, slip op. at 3 (D. Ariz. Oct. 30, 1989).
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fall among the entities that 11 U.S.C. § 109 precludes from protection under
the Bankruptcy Code.'
The Arizona District Court rejected the RTC's argument that FIRREA
authorized the RTC to take over the "assets" of failed thrifts. 28 The court
believed any expansive construction of the term "assets" was strained in the
absence of a Congressional intent. The court disfavored repealing by
implication one of two conflicting statutes and believed that Congress must
manifest a clear legislative intent to repeal a statute. Therefore, the court
attempted to reconcile the two conflicting titles.29 The court found that the
RTC's basic functions as conservator or receiver went unaffected by Chapter
11 supervision of the subsidiaries. The court reasoned that the RTC does not
act as the designated conservator of the subsidiaries, but instead merely
exercises powers of a shareholder pursuant to state law. The court believed
that Chapter 11 administration would ensure a more orderly resolution and
provide a measure of protection for the interests of subsidiary debtor estates
and their creditors-interests that the court believed FIRREA did not intend
to disregard. Therefore, the court denied the motion to dismiss, holding that
a district court could resolve conflicts between Title 11 and Title 12. The
court acknowledged a possible future avenue for the RTC to pursue under 11
U.S.C. § 305(a)(1) if the "'interests
of creditors and the debtor would be
3
better served by such dismissal.'" 1
The American Continental decision seemed favorable for the Landmark
debtbr subsidiaries. However, the Fourth Circuit did not clearly distinguish
its decision from American Continental. Although Landmark seems to mirror
American Continental, the issues, when framed narrowly, distinguish the two
cases. In American Continental, the court solely addressed the issue of
whether the "pervasive conflicts" between Title 11 and Title 12 required the
district court 'to dismiss the bankruptcy proceedings. 3 The FSLIC had
already voted the stock of the bankrupt subsidiaries, replaced the management,
and taken control of the subsidiaries subsequent to the bankruptcy filing. The
American Continental court suggested that a district court may dismiss
bankruptcy proceedings when a fact-intensive analysis of statutory requirements warrant such action.32 On the other hand, in Landmark the district
court enjoined the RTC from assuming control of the subsidiaries, 33 and the
issue of the propriety of a bankruptcy dismissal was not presented. However,
27. Id.
28. Id. slip op. at 5.
29. Id.
30. Id. slip op. at 6 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 305 (a)(1)(1988)).
31. In re American ContinentalCorp., Ch. 7 Case No. B-89-3117 PHX-SSC, No. Civ. 891231 PHX-RMB, slip op. at 2 (D. Ariz. Oct. 30, 1989).
32. Id. slip op. at 5.
33. In re Landmark Land Co., 973 F.2d at 287.
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the Fourth Circuit implied that if RTC moved to dismiss the bankruptcy
proceedings, a court could properly grant such a motion, stating that: "The
RTC is well within its statutory authority to take control of [a] subsidiary in
which it holds a 100% ownership interest, without interference by the
bankruptcy or district court. "3
Unfortunately the Fourth Circuit did not consider a more in-depth analysis
of this statutory conflict necessary. The opinion provides little guidance for
analyzing similar parent/subsidiary arrangements. A fair question would be:
Does the RTC, as a federal agency, effectively accomplish indirectly, as the
100 percent owner of the debtor subsidiaries, what it is prohibited from doing
directly, as a creditor of the debtor subsidiaries? For example, assume a failed
savings and loan association owns less than 100 percent of a bankrupt nonthrift
corporation. Landmark suggests the same result, but its policy-based tone
does not provide a strong argument.
The Fourth Circuit interpreted FIRREA's anti-injunction provision, 12
U.S.C. § 1821(j), as precluding any injunctive action when the RTC acts
within the scope of its authority as receiver or conservator."5 The debtor
subsidiaries maintained that this provision did not negate a district court's
power to enjoin RTC interference with Chapter 11 reorganizations of nonthrift
subsidiaries of a failed savings and loan administered by the RTC. 36 The
RTC contended that § 18210) deprives a district court of jurisdiction to enjoin
the RTC from undertaking. its express obligation to takeover, and operate a
wholly-owned asset of the failed institution.37 Specifically, § 18210) states:
"Except as provided in this section, no court may take any action, except at
the request of the Board of Directors by regulation or order, to restrain or
affect the exercise of powers or functions of the Corporation as a conservator
or a receiver.31
In Landmark, the Fourth Circuit based its decision heavily on other
courts' interpretation of § 18210) and similar anti-injunction provisions.39
These decisions support the proposition that Congress designed the specific
anti-injunction provisions of other titles of the United States Code to protect
the integrity of administrative actions until they are final and judicial review
becomes available for aggrieved parties. As a result, the prevailing view is
that these statutes supersede the general language of the Bankruptcy Code.4"
Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit concluded that "[b]ecause the anti-injunction

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id. at 290.
Id.
See Brief of Appellees at 1.
See Brief of Appellant at 2.
12 U.S.C. § 1821(0) (Supp. IV 1992).
In re Landmark Land Co., 973 F.2d at 289-90.

40. See id.
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provision specifically precludes equitable interference, the district court may
not prevent the RTC from exercising its lawful ownership rights." 4 The
following discussion examines these interpretations and notes the potential
roadblocks these provisions create for debtors.
In Rosa v. Resolution Trust Corp.42 the RTC, as conservator of a failed
institution, determined that it would continue the institution's Minimum
Retirement Benefit Plan in which the plaintiffs were beneficiaries. The plan
was subject to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
("ERISA"). 43 The institution, through the RTC, made two contribution
payments to the trustee as they became due. Subsequently, the RTC
considered terminating the plan. No party made any further contributions.
The district court enjoined the RTC from taking any further action to terminate
the plan or any adverse or prejudicial action. Further, the court ordered the
44
RTC to pay all contributions on a timely basis as required by the plan.
The RTC contended that FIRREA's anti-injunction provision, 12 U.S.C.
§ 1821(j), prohibited the district court's injunction except as to the RTC in its
corporate capacity. In other words, § 1821(j) prohibited interference with the
RTC in its capacity as receiver or conservator. The Third Circuit noted that
"to the extent of a conflict between [§ 18210)] and provisions of ERISA
authorizing relief, § 18210) controls."'s The Rosa court addressed the issue
of whether the terms of the preliminary injunction requiring payments to the
plan would "'restrain or affect the exercise' of those powers" granted to the
RTC in § 1821(d)(2). 41 The court found that the timely contribution
requirements impinged on the RTC's statutory powers "to 'preserve and
conserve the assets and property of such institution. "41 Finally, the court
concluded that the injunction's nonmonetary provisions "encroached on the
48
exercise of statutory power residing in RTC as receiver and conservator.

41. Id. at 290.
42. 938 F.2d 383 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 582 (1991).
43. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988 & Supps. I-IV).
44. Rosa, 938 F.2d at 388-90.
45. Id. at 397.
46. Id. at 398 (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 18210))
47. Id. (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(2)(B)(iv) (Supp. 11989)). The court reasoned that the
provisions clearly required distribution of the institution's assets which encroached on the RTC's
power to preserve and dispose of the assets it controlled. Further, such liquidation would accord
the plan's trustee and beneficiaries a preference over other creditors. Id.
48. Id. at 399. The court found that the institution's board of directors reserved the right to
amend, suspend, or terminate the plan. Id. at 398-99. The court concluded that under 12 U.S.C.
§ 1821(d)(2)(A)(i), the RTC "succeeded to the termination rights contained in the original plan."
Id. at 399. It emphasized that § 18210) serves to prevent a particular remedy in the interest of
allowing the RTC, as receiver or conservator, promptly to carry out its mandate to resolve the
thrift industry crisis. Id.
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The Fifth Circuit reached a similar conclusion under its interpretation of
§ 18210) in 281-300 Joint Venture v. Onion.49 In Onion the plaintiff sought
to enjoin the RTC, as conservator of a new federally-chartered institution,
from conducting a foreclosure sale. The court concluded that courts lack the
ability to enjoin nonjudicial foreclosures that fall within the RTC's statutory
powers as conservator or receiver.50
The Fourth Circuit reached a similar result in an order entitled Automated
Business Systems & Services, Inc. v. FDIC." Automated Business Systems
and Services, Inc. sought a preliminary injunction to enjoin the Federal
Insurance Deposit Corporation "'from impounding or freezing the cash flows
generated or being held by' the FDIC."52 The Fourth Circuit denied the
motion on the ground that § 1821(j) expressly prohibited restraining the
liquidation of assets.5 3
In Telematics International, Inc. v. NEMLC Leasing Corp., the First
Circuit held that under § 1821(j) a federal court lacks jurisdiction to enjoin the
FDIC, as receiver for a banking institution, "from attaching a certificate of
deposit in which the banking institution holds a security interest."" The
First Circuit stated that Congress enacted § 1821(j) to provide a broad limit
on the power of courts to interfere with the FDIC's efforts to preserve the
assets of a failed financial institution quickly and without undue interruption.56 The court stated that "the elaborate structure created by FIRREA, and
the evident intent of Congress that the structure should be permitted to stand
with minimal court interference [require the conclusion] that section 18210)
deprived the district court of jurisdiction to enter the injunction. . . . Such

49. 938 F.2d 35 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 933 (1992).
50. Id. at 39 (citing FSLIC v. Hall Whispertree Assocs., 653 F. Supp. 148, 150 (N.D. Tex.
1986)). The court reasoned that the ability of the RTC to foreclose on the debtor's property
existed under FIRREA. Id. This rationale stemmed from the RTC's "broad authority to dispose
of assets and to 'collect all obligations and money due the [failed] institution.'" Id. (alteration in
original) (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(2)(B)(ii) (Supp. 11989)).
51. No. 90-1513 (4th Cir. Aug. 27, 1990).
52. Id. slip op. at 1 (quoting appellant's request).
53. Id. slip op. at 2.
54. 967 F.2d 703 (1st Cir. 1992).
55. Id. at 704. Lessor NEMLC Leasing Corp. assigned its assets, including the lease
underlying the action, to the New Bank of New England ("NBNE"). Telematics International,
Inc. ("Telematies") and Digital Radio Networks ("Digital") were the lessees. The FDIC was
appointed as receiver for NBNE, and succeeded to NBNE's rights under the lease. Telematics
originally granted NEMLC a security interest in a certificate of deposit to secure Digital's
performance. Digital subsequently defaulted under the terms of the lease, and the FDIC sought
to foreclose upon the pledged certificate of deposit. Id.
56. Id. at 705.
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judicial interference would dramatically limit the FDIC's ability to exercise its
statutory powers efficiently and effectively." 5 7
Additionally, courts conclude that anti-injunctive language found in other
titles of the United States Code supersedes the general language of the
Bankruptcy Code. For example, in Boardof Governorsof the FederalReserve
System of the United States v. MCorp Financial,Inc. ," the Supreme Court
held that the general provisions that govern bankruptcy proceedings do not
supersede the specific preclusive language in 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i)(1). 59
MCorp, a bank holding company, filed voluntary bankruptcy petitions and
then initiated an adversary proceeding against the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System ("Board") to enjoin the prosecution of two administrative proceedings. The Supreme Court held that the district court lacked
jurisdiction to enjoin either regulatory proceeding.' Nevertheless, MCorp
argued that either the automatic stay provision in the Bankruptcy Code6' or
28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) - authorized the injunction.63 The Court rejected the
argument that the automatic stay provisions apply to ongoing, nonfinal
administrative proceedings." 4 Further, the Court rejected the second
argument that 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) authorized a district court to exercise
concurrent jurisdiction over certain bankruptcy-related civil proceedings. 6'
The Court found MCorp's reliance on § 1334(b) to be misplaced in that an

57. Id. at 705-06 (citations omitted).
58. 112 S. Ct. 459 (1991).
59. Id. at 465. Section 1818(i)(1) provides: "[E]xcept as otherwise provided in this section
...no court shall have jurisdiction to affect by injunction or otherwise the issuance or
enforcement of any notice or order under any such section, or to review, modify, suspend,
terminate, or set aside any such notice or order." 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i)(1) (Supp. IV 1992).
60. MCorp Fin., Inc., 112 S. Ct. at 466.

61. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1988) authorizes automatic stays to protect the debtor.
62. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (1988) authorizes district courts in bankruptcy proceedings to
exercise concurrent jurisdiction over certain civil proceedings that would otherwise be subject to
the exclusive jurisdiction of another court.
63. MCorp Fin., Inc., 112 S. Ct. at 463.

64. Id. at 464. The Court stated that these proceedings enforced a "'governmental unit's
police or regulatory power,'" and therefore, were expressly exempted by the automatic stay
exception in § 362(b)(4). Id. (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4) (1988)). This section is qualified
by the legislative statements that § 362(b)(4) is "to be given a narrow construction in order to
permit governmental units to pursue actions to protect the public health and safety and not to
apply to actions by a governmental unit to protect a pecuniary interest inproperty of the debtor
or property of the estate." 11 U.S.C. § 362 legislative statements (1988).
The automatic stay may have met the same fate in Landmark had the Fourth Circuit
addressed § 362(a)'s application. The Landmark court apparently took the position that the case
did not specifically present the question of whether the RTC is subject to the automatic stay of
Title 11, but rather Title 12 precludes a court from enjoining the RTC from exercising control
over the bankrupt subsidiaries of a failed thrift. See In re Landmark Land Co., 973 F.2d at 287.
65. MCorp Fin., Inc., 112 S. Ct. at 465.
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administrative agency such as the board was not a "court" for purposes of that
section.'
Realistically, MCorp resolved little of the conflicting issues in
Landmark, but rather decided only one of many tangles emerging between the
banking and bankruptcy laws. 67
Similarly, pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a), the Fourth Circuit held that
the bankruptcy court lacked authority to issue a preliminary injunction

restraining the revocation by the IRS of a nonprofit organization's tax-exempt

status. 6' This provision, the Anti-Injunction Act, provides that "no suit for
the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax shall be
maintained in any court by any person, whether or not such person is the
person against whom such tax was assessed. "69 In Clark the court stated:
"There is no express provision in the Bankruptcy Code indicating congressional intent that the Code supersede the Anti-Injunction Act. 70 In recognizing
the clear mandate of the Anti-Injunction Act to prohibit such injunctions, the
court continued: "Although revocation may potentially obstruct the orderly
administration in bankruptcy, we decline to create an exception to the Act in
the absence of express congressional intent."71
In Carlton v. Firstcorp, Inc.72 the Fourth Circuit affirmed a district
court's ruling that a provision of the Financial Institutions Supervisory Act of
1966 ("FISA")73 superseded the Bankruptcy Code's automatic stay. 74

66. Id. "[Tihe prosecution of the Board proceedings, prior to the entry of a final order and
prior to the commencement of any enforcement action, seems unlikely to impair the Bankruptcy
Court's exclusivejurisdiction over the property of the estate. . . ."Id. The Court suggested that
if the proceedings culminated in a final order, and judicial proceedings commenced to enforce
the order, the Bankruptcy Court might properly exercise its concurrent jurisdiction under
§ 1334(b). See id.
67. However, Landmark did not involve an administrative proceeding. It involved a district
court's preliminary injunction preventing the RTC, as receiver, from voting stock owned by the
failed thrift. Still, as apparent from the Fourth Circuit's decision, any precedent favoring
regulators presents a danger to debtor entities. Prior to the Landmark decision, John L. Douglas
of Atlanta's Alston & Bird, who represented Landmark against the RTC, commented: "'MCorp
is clearly a gorilla here because the courts have sided with the government, but it's not clear how
big a gorilla it is."' Sontag, supra note 2, at 15. Apparently, MCorp was a larger gorilla than
Mr. Douglas preferred in that the Landmark decision suggests that this pack of gorillas favoring
regulators may continue to grow.
68. Clark v. United States (In re Heritage Village Church & Missionary Fellowship, Inc.),
851 F.2d 104, 105 (4th Cir. 1988) (per curiam).
69. 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a) (1988).
70. Clark, 851 F.2d at 105 (citing LaSalle Rolling Mills, Inc. v. United States (In re LaSalle
Rolling Mills, Inc.), 832 F.2d 390, 394 (7th Cir. 1987)).
71. Id. at 106.
72. 67 F.2d 942 (4th Cir. 1992).
73. FISA is codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i)(1) (Supp. IV 1992); see also supra note 59 and
accompanying text.
74. Carlton, 967 F.2d at 943. In Carlton the Office of Thrift Supervision, pursuant to its
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Recognizing that the Supreme Court's decision in MCorp controlled a major
part of Firstcorp's appeal, the Fourth Circuit ruled that § 1818(i)(1) precludes75
application of the automatic stay provision to an administrative proceeding.
The court held that the Supreme Court's reasoning in MCorp applied equally
to temporary cease and desist orders of regulatory agencies. 76 Finally, the
court concluded that § 1818(i)(1) is part of "a unified regulatory scheme which
7
under MCorp is free from the intrusion of bankruptcy's automatic stay."
Post-Landmarkdecisions have relied on the Fourth Circuit's Landmark
opinion to reach similar results in other contexts. In Furgatch v. Resolution
Trust Corp.78 a district court cited Landmark for the proposition that "the
only relevant question when applying [§] 18210) is whether the conservator
or receiver is carrying out a statutory function or power. "7 If so, the court
may not issue an injunction."0 Accordingly, the court held that an RTC real
estate foreclosure sale is within its statutory powers and consequently
"[§] 1821(j)'s clear and unambiguous prescription prevent[ed the court] from
enjoining the RTC in conducting a nonjudicial foreclosure sale.""1 However,
the Second Circuit distinguished Landmark, holding that § 18210) does not
inhibit the operation of the automatic stay imposed by 11 U.S.C. § 362(a). 82
The court reasoned that Congressional mandate, not court order, imposed the
84
automatic stay 3 which does not require court action to take effect.
Injunctive relief is appropriate where that remedy is imposed by statute
automatically and by operation of law without any action by a court. The
weight of authority suggests that most circuits interpret anti-injunction
provisions in favor of the federal regulatory agency which the particular

authority under FISA, ordered Firstcorp, Inc., a savings and loan holding company, to decrease
a Firstcorp-operated savings institution's insolvency and issued a temporary cease and desist
order. Additionally, the OTS initiated an administrative proceeding designed to result in a final
cease-and-desist order. Following this action, Firstcorp filed for protection under Chapter 11
and sought an order confirming that the automatic stay provisions of § 362 suspended the actions
of the OTS. Subsequently, the OTS declared the savings institution insolvent, appointed the RTC
as receiver, and chartered a new federal savings association that purchased the assets and assumed
the liabilities of the insolvent thrift. Id. at 943-44.
75. Id. at 945-46.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 946. While the Carlton decision precludes applying the automatic stay to a
temporary cease and desist order, a party may still apply for an injunction under § 1818(c)(2).
78. Civ. No. 93-20304 SW, 1993 WL 149084 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 30, 1993).
79. Id. at *2.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. FDIC v. Hirsch (In re Colonial Realty Co.), 980 F.2d 125 (2d Cir. 1992).
83. Id.at 137 (citing Gross v. Bell Say. Bank, 974 F.2d 403, 407 (3d Cir. 1992)).
84. Id.(citing 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1988)).
85. See, e.g., In re Lane, 136 B.R. 319, 320-21 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1992).
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provision was designed to benefit. The rationale most often noted is
Congress's apparent intent to allow these regulatory agencies full rein to
exercise their statutory authority without injunctive restraints. The general
consensus is that a district court retains general jurisdiction over bankruptcy
cases commenced by debtors and, generally, over the debtor's estates.
However, FIRREA limited a court's power to act in particular matters. The
"comprehensive statutory scheme" referred to in Landmark, while not
divesting a court's jurisdiction over the debtor's assets, limits the court's
powers to act in certain proceedings that focus on the disposition of the assets..
In other words, the court retains adequate jurisdiction under the Bankruptcy
Code; however, Landmark suggests that the court must respect and honor
other statutory mandates that limit the court's bankruptcy powers.
Evidently, § 18210) does not create a complete roadblock to injunctive
actions. For instance, the Code provides opportunities for injunctive relief
where appropriate. 6 Additionally, a few courts permit injunctions when the
plaintiff alleges the regulatory agency acted beyond the scope of its statutory
authority. 7
Still, some commentators express concern about the potential liberal effect
from Landmark and other decisions that limit the RTC's receivership powers
in handling the affairs of a failed savings and loan when those powers conflict
with the Bankruptcy Code's provisions. For example, one commentator states:
"'The court of appeals is rapidly creating a monster called the RTC that is
above litigation.'"8 Patrick M. Duffy of the Charleston office of McNair
& Sanford, P.A., who represented the Landmark debtor subsidiaries,
characterized the decision as "'a very broad opinion, and one that I expect the
RTC to rely on very heavily in subsequent proceedings-which I do not think
is a happy prospect for those outside of government.'"89 Further, John L.

86. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1818(c)(2) (Supp. IV 1992) (allowing injunctive relief from
temporary cease and desist order).
87. See, e.g., Cummings Properties Management, Inc. v. FDIC, 786 F. Supp. 144 (D. Mass.
1992) (holding that the anti-injunction provision did not bar the court from determining whether
a particular action of the receiver fell within its statutory power), order vacated & appeal
dismissed as moot, No. 92-1504, 1992 WL 366909 (1st Cir. Sept. 1, 1992); Gross v. Resolution
Trust Corp., No. 92-0286, 1992 WL 55741 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 13, 1992) (holding anti-injunction
provision of FIRREA does not preclude a temporary restraining order to determine authority of
RTC to specific action), rev'd sub nom. Gross v. Bell Say. Bank, 974 F.2d 403 (3d Cir. 1992).
88. Karen Donovan, CourtsProp Up Receivers'PowersUnderBailoutLaw, Nat'l L.J., Sept.
28, 1992, at 21 (quoting Alan S. Fellheimer of Philadelphia's Fellheimer & Eichen, P.C. in
response to Gross v. Bell Say. Bank, 974 F.2d 403 (3d. Cir. 1992)). In Gross the court of
appeals held that § 18210) blocked the district court's power to grant an injunction requiring the
RTC to release pension and profit-sharing assets under its control. Specifically, § 1821(j) limited
the plaintiff to a damages suit against the RTC for poor business judgment rather than an
injunction remedy. Gross, 974 F.2d at 408.
89. Donovan, supra note 88, at 21.
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Douglas of Atlanta's Alston & Bird, lead counsel for the debtor subsidiaries,
surmised that "'[t]here is a real danger that, when all these decisions are added
up, that this is an agency that is beyond judicial scrutiny or judicial review. "9 The broad language of Landmark probably raises more questions
than it answers. Given the large number of financial institution failures, the
court will likely be forced to re-address the interplay of the FIRREA
receivership provisions with the Bankruptcy Code in the future.
On balance the Landmark opinion illustrates a proper statutory interpretation, and its ruling should aid the government in resolving the monumental
savings and loan crisis. One hopes, the RTC, in using this decision as a
springboard for resolving the thrift crisis, will direct any adverse impact to
those responsible for the thrift disaster and attempt to minimize any detrimental impact on innocent creditors and other contracting parties. In dealing with
corporate subsidiaries, these third parties expect that commercial remedies
available in the event of insolvency include recourse to Bankruptcy Code
provisions. The Landmark decision arguably suggests that when the parent
financial institution becomes insolvent as well, only the RTC retains the power
to decide what rights and remedies are available to these third parties.
RichardF. Hewitt Jr.

II. COURT IMPLIEDLY EXPANDS A LENDER'S PERMISSIBLE INVOLVEMENT
IN REAL ESTATE DEVELOPMENTS TO WHICH IT HAS LOANED MONEY

In Peoples FederalSavings & Loan Ass'n v. Myrtle Beach Golf & Yacht
Club' the South Carolina Court of Appeals held that a lender was not
individually liable for the debt secured by a mortgage in a real estate
development project that the lender initially financed. The court rejected
several theories of lender liability, but did not significantly modify this area
of law. However, the court's application of existing law may have impliedly
expanded the degree that a lender may participate in the operation and
management of a real estate development project to which it has loaned funds
without incurring individual liability to the project's third party creditors.
The case involved an action for a mortgage foreclosure initiated by
Peoples Federal Savings & Loan Association ("Peoples"). In 1984, Justice,
Inc. ("Justice"), through its president, R. L. Propps, approached Peoples
about financing the purchase and development of property in Myrtle Beach,
South Carolina. The proposal involved the construction, lease, and sale of

90. Id. (alteration in original).
1. _

S.C.

_, 425 S.E.2d 764 (Ct. App. 1992).
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single and multi-family dwellings and an amenities tract featuring a golf
course, club house, tennis courts, and swimming pool. In return for providing
funding, Peoples would share in the profits from the development through a
wholly owned subsidiary corporation. 2
To accomplish this plan, Peoples incorporated a subsidiary, Peoples Joint
Venture Group, Inc. ("Peoples Venture"), and Justice incorporated its own
subsidiary, Myrtle Beach Golf and Yacht Club, Inc. ("MBGYC"). These two
subsidiary corporations then formed a partnership known as Myrtle Beach Golf
and Yacht Club ("the Partnership") on February 28, 1984. Peoples Venture
and MBGYC owned 25% and 75% of the Partnership, respectively. The
partners agreed to share the project's profits and losses in proportion to their
ownership percentages. The partnership agreement stated that the Partnership
would borrow money from "an affiliate of Peoples [Joint Venture]. " '
Further, it provided that MBGYC would be the managing general partner,
"but gave Peoples Venture veto authority over major management decisions."I
From February 29 to September 20, 1984, Peoples loaned a total of
$6,650,000 to the Partnership for acquisition, construction, and development
costs. The Partnership acquired the property and commenced construction.5
In June 1985, a predecessor corporation to one of the appellants, American
Community Development Group, Inc. ("ACDG"), proposed to buy Propps's
interest in the development. On August 9, 1985, Peoples sold all of its stock
in Peoples Venture to Propps for $403,000, and accepted a promissory note
and mortgage on the development for the amount of the stock purchase price.
ACDG claimed that the parties based the purchase price on the estimated
profits Peoples would have received if it had stayed in the project. 6
On August 13, 1985, Loyola Federal Savings and Loan became the
principal lender for the project by committing $13,000,000 to the Partnership
for development of the housing tract. Peoples focused on developing the
amenities tract. On October 9, 1985, Peoples loaned the Partnership
$5,100,000 from which it refinanced the $3,000,000 amenities loan from
1984. 7
To purchase Propps's interest in the development, ACDG transferred
$750,000 to MBGYC and $150,000 to Justice between September 30 and
October 30, 1985. However, in January 1986, Propps and his partner
disagreed about ACDG's purchase of Propps's interest in the Partnership,
causing ACDG to cancel the purchase of the project. Subsequently, Justice,

2. Id. at __, 425 S.E.2d at 767.
3. Id. at __, 425 S.E.2d at 767 (alteration in original).
4. Id. at
, 425 S.E.2d at 769-70.
5. Id. at
, 425 S.E.2d at 768.
6. Peoples Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, _ S.C. at _, 425 S.E.2d at 771.
7. Id. at _, 425 S.E.2d at 768-69.
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MBGYC's parent corporation, signed a promissory note to repay ACDG the
$750,000 it had advanced to MBGYC, and the Partnership also signed a
promissory note to repay ACDG for its $150,000 advancement. Justice and
the Partnership eventually defaulted on these notes.'
In June 1986, Propps and Justice sold their interests in the Partnership to
the Myrtle Beach Holding Corporation. ACDG then filed for involuntary
bankruptcy. 9 In March 1987, ACDG sued Propps, Justice, and the Partnership to recover on the two notes. A court-approved settlement required the
Partnership to sign a new note and give ACDG a mortgage lien on all of the
Partnership's property. However, the new note was subordinate to the
mortgage lien that Peoples had on the property.10 In September 1988,
Peoples commenced a foreclosure action against the Partnership, MBGYC,
ACDG, and numerous other defendants. ACDG answered and counterclaimed
that Peoples was liable for the Partnership's note secured by the mortgage on
the development. The master in equity ruled that the mortgage held by
Peoples had priority over ACDG's mortgage and ordered it foreclosed as a
first lien. ACDG appealed," advancing several theories of lender liability
all of which the court of appeals rejected.
First, the court of appeals applied the two-prong test of Sturkie v. Sifly' 2
and refused to pierce Peoples Venture's corporate veil so as to make Peoples
liable for Peoples Venture's debt to the Partnership. The first prong of the
Sturkie analysis includes an application of the eight factors listed in DeWitt
Truck Brokers, Inc. v. W. Ray Flemming Fruit Co. 3 to determine if the
dominant shareholders sufficiently observed corporate formalities. 4 ACDG
satisfied the first prong of Sturkie by showing that Peoples Venture was
undercapitalized, failed to observe corporate formalities, shared corporate
offices and directors with Peoples, and was a front for the business of
Peoples. 5 However, DeWitt also requires a showing of injustice or fundamental unfairness before the court will pierce the corporate veil. 6 To

425 S.E.2d at 769.
8. Id. at
, 425 S.E.2d at 769.
9. Id. at
425 S.E.2d at 769.
10. Id. at
11. Peoples Fed. Say. & Loan Assn, _ S.C. at _, 425 S.E.2d at 767.
12. 280 S.C. 453, 313 S.E.2d 316 (Ct. App. 1984).
13. 540 F.2d 681 (4th Cir. 1976). The eight DeWitt factors are: (1) failure to provide
adequate capital; (2) failure to observe corporate formalities; (3) nonpayment of dividends; (4)
the insolvency of the debtor corporation; (5) siphoning of funds of the corporation by the
dominant stockholder(s); (6) nonfunctioning of other officers or directors; (7) absence of
corporate records; and (8) whether the corporation is merely a facade for the operations of the
dominant stockholder(s). Id. at 686-87.
14. Sturkie, 280 S.C. at 457, 313 S.E.2d at 318.
15. Peoples Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn, _ S.C. at _, 425 S.E.2d at 770.
16. DeWitt Truck Brokers, Inc., 540 F.2d at 687.
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establish fundamental unfairness, the second prong of Sturkie requires the
plaintiff to establish "(1) that the defendant was aware of the plaintiff's claim
against the corporation, and (2) thereafter, the defendant acted in a self-serving
manner with regard to the property of the corporation and in disregard of the
plaintiff's claim in the property."' 7 However, the court of appeals concluded
that ACDG had not established injustice or fundamental unfairness because
Peoples was unaware of any claim by ACDG against the Partnership when
Peoples sold its Peoples Venture stock to Propps. 18
Although the court of appeals refused to pierce Peoples Venture's
corporate veil and hold Peoples liable as its sole shareholder, the court
indicated that Peoples could be liable for Peoples Venture's share of the
Partnership debt under one or more of ACDG's overlapping theories. 9
The court of appeals stated that Peoples could be held liable under the
participation/involvement theory of Kennedy v. Columbia Lumber &
Manufacturing Co.20 and Roundtree Villas Ass'n v. 4701 Kings Corp.21 if,
as a lender, Peoples "was an active participant .. . in the construction,
management, and marketing of the development."22 However, the court
noted that under Roundtree a lender will not be liable for construction defects
occurring prior to the lender's involvement in the construction, repair, and
management of the project.' The court of appeals inferred from Roundtree
that "a lender also will not be held liable for defects or injury occurring after
it in good faith removes itself from the project, unless the defects or injury
may be traced to its prior involvement."24
To support another theory of liability based on the participation/involvement of Peoples, ACDG identified the following activity by
Peoples with the Partnership after the August 9, 1985 stock sale: Peoples
advanced money to the Partnership after the project's construction stopped and
guaranteed payments and issued checks directly to subcontractors, undercapitalized the Partnership, retained an interest in the profits from the development, and communicated with the homeowners association regarding
homeowner concerns. Further, Peoples advanced money to the Partnership's

17. Sturkie, 280 S.C. at 459, 313 S.E.2d at 319.
18. Peoples Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, _ S.C. at _, 425 S.E.2d at 770.
19. Id. at _, 425 S.E.2d at 769-75. ACDG asserted five theories to hold Peoples liable for
Peoples Venture's partnership debt: (1) participation/involvement liability, (2) principal/agent
liability, (3) joint venture liability, (4) instrumentality or alter ego liability, and (5) the doctrine
of equitable subordination. Id.
20. 299 S.C. 335, 384 S.E.2d 730 (1989).
21. 282 S.C. 415, 321 S.E.2d 46 (1984).
22. PeoplesFed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, __ S.C. at _, 425 S.E.2d at 770.
23. Id. at _,
425 S.E.2d at 770; see also Roundtree Villas Ass'n, 282 S.C. at 423, 321
S.E.2d at 50-51.
24. Peoples Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, __ S.C. at _, 425 S.E.2d at 770.
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payroll, participated in efforts to sell the project, and sent letters to government agencies requesting approval of the project.' ACDG's experts testified
that Peoples' involvement in the project constituted abnormal commercial
practices for a lender. 6
In spite of this involvement, the court of appeals rejected this theory of
liability by holding that Peoples' involvement with the project fell below the
level required for liability under Roundtree.2
The court stated that such
involvement was not "unusual under the circumstances" because Peoples
wanted the project to succeed and had abandoned the project only after it
determined that the project's necessary capital would overwhelm its funding
capabilities. 8 Accordingly, the court of appeals held that Peoples effectively
removed itself from the project by selling the stock of its subsidiary and was
therefore not liable for the debt incurred by the Partnership after the sale. 9
The court of appeals also refused to hold Peoples individually liable for
the Partnership debt under the principal/agent theory of liability. Under this
theory, a lender becomes liable for the obligations of a business if it takes de
facto control over the business either in person or through an agent.3"
Reiterating Peoples' involvement in the project, ACDG argued that Peoples
had total control of the Partnership both before and after the August 9th sale.
The court of appeals noted that ACDG failed to offer evidence that Peoples
made any construction or development recommendations to the Partnership
after the sale and that Peoples acted primarily to protect its collateral in the
project. Consequently, the court held that Peoples' actions taken after August
9, 1985 did not demonstrate the de facto control over the Partnership
necessary to impose individual liability on Peoples as a lender. 3'
The court of appeals also summarily rejected ACDG's attempt to impose
liability on Peoples under a joint venture liability theory. Joint venture
liability arises when two or more persons united in a common enterprise
possess equal authority, express or implied, to act for all in the control and
execution of the enterprise and to direct the conduct of each other with respect
to the enterprise." ACDG cited CentralBank, N.A. v. Baldwin,33 a Nevada

25. Id. at __,425 S.E.2d at 770-71.
26. Id. at __, 425 S.E.2d at 770-71.
27. Id. at _,
425 S.E.2d at 772-73.
28. Id. at
,425 S.E.2d at 772.
29. Peoples Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, _ S.C. at _, 425 S.E.2d at 772-73.
30. Id. at _, 425 S.E.2d at 773 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 14(0) cmt.
a (1958)).
31. Id. at __, 425 S.E.2d at 773-74 (citing A. Gay Jenson Farms Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 309
N.W.2d 285 (Minn. 1981)).
32. Id. at _, 425 S.E.2d at 774 (citing Spradley v. Houser, 247 S.C. 208, 146 S.E.2d 621
(1966) and Long v. Carolina Baking Co., 190 S.C. 367, 3 S.E.2d 46 (1939)).
33. 583 P.2d 1087 (Nev. 1978).
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case, which held a lender liable as a joint venturer in a construction project.
In Baldwin the lender loaned money for the project, approached the building
contractor to "joint venture" the construction project, and owned half of the
construction company's stock through its wholly owned subsidiary.34 Based
on much of its previous analysis of other liability theories, the court of appeals
concluded that the joint venture theory was also inapplicable to Peoples.35
ACDG also sought to hold Peoples liable under the instrumentality or
alter ego theory in which liability results when the lender controls the business
decisions and actions of its borrower such that the borrower, in effect,
becomes the lender's instrument or alter ego. 36 Further, under this theory,
the lender must achieve "total domination" over the borrower so that the
borrower exists solely to effectuate the lender's purpose, and then the lender
must misuse that control. 37 The court of appeals rejected this theory because
it found that Peoples neither exercised the requisite total control over the
Partnership after August 9, 1985, nor misused its influence to benefit itself.38
A final liability theory that ACDG argued was that Peoples should be
individually liable for the Partnership's debt under the doctrine of equitable
subordination.3 9 Bankruptcy courts use this doctrine to subordinate a
shareholder's claim as creditor of a bankrupt corporation to -the claims of
outside creditors when the shareholder's claim is actually an equitable
investment rather that a bona fide debt.40 After discussing the grounds for
applying the doctrine as articulated in Pepper v. Litton4' and in Machinery
Rental Inc. v. Herpell (In re Multiponics, Inc.),42 the court stated that "[t]he
linchpin in the decisions applying the doctrine of equitable subordination is the
conviction that insider misconduct caused injury to the creditors of a bankrupt
corporation." 4 3 The court of appeals held the doctrine of equitable subordination inapplicable because the evidence failed to show that Peoples was an

34. Id. at 1089.
35. Peoples Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, __ S.C. at _, 425 S.E.2d at 774.
36. Id. at _, 425 S.E.2d at 774 (citing 10 S.C. JUR. Banks and Banking § 170 (1992)).
37. Id. at_, 425 S.E.2d at 774 (citing Krivo Indus. Supply Co. v. Nat'l Distillers & Chem.
Corp., 483 F.2d 1098 (5th Cir. 1973)).
38. Id. at
, 425 S.E.2d at 774.
39. Id. at,
425 S.E.2d at 774-75.
40. Peoples Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, _ S.C. at
, 425 S.E.2d at 775 (citing Taylor v.
Standard Gas & Elec. Co., 306 U.S. 307 (1939)).
41. 308 U.S. 295 (1939).
42. 622 F.2d 709 (5th Cir. 1980).
43. PeoplesFed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, _ S.C. at _, 425 S.E.2d at 775 (citing Barquist v.
First Nat'l Bank (In re American Lumber Co.), 7 B.R. 519 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1979) and 10 S.C.
JUR. Banks and Banking § 173 (1992)).
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insider after the stock sale or that it at any time engaged in inequitable conduct
that injured ACDG or any other creditors.'
Equity also defeated any of ACDG's claim of priority over Peoples'
mortgage because ACDG's mortgage emanated solely from the investment of
funds to purchase Propps's partnership interest, while Peoples' mortgage arose
from its loans to the Partnership used for development of the project. The
court noted that the express language of ACDG's mortgage (subordinating
itself to Peoples' mortgage) estopped ACDG from asserting priority.4"
In summary, the court of appeals concluded that Peoples was not involved
in a joint venture with the Partnership after the August 9, 1985 stock sale, that
Peoples did not control the finances or management of the Partnership after
that date, and that "[tihe actions of Peoples were either in keeping with usual
lender practices or were done with the consent of the Partnership or the court
the intent of protecting its collateral and ensuring the viability of the
and with 46
project."
The court of appeals decision in this case, holding that Peoples' mortgage
was superior to ACDG's mortgage, was indeed appropriate considering the
following: (1) the express terms of ACDG's mortgage subordinating it to
Peoples' mortgage; (2) the financing arrangements upon which the respective
mortgages arose; and (3) ACDG's knowledge of the stock sale prior to both
its investment and acceptance of the Partnership's note and mortgage.
However, the court of appeals' application of existing law raises two potential
concerns.
First, as discussed above,47 the first prong of the Sturkie v. Sifly48 veilpiercing test includes an examination of the eight factors listed in DeWitt Truck
Brokers, Inc. v. W. Ray Flemming Fruit Co.49 to determine if the dominant
shareholder sufficiently observed the corporate formalities. The second prong
of the test requires the plaintiff to show some element of injustice or
fundamental unfairness before the court will attribute the acts of the corporation to the dominate shareholder.50
Stringent application of the second prong of the Sturkie test could
apparently produce inequitable results. For example, consider a situation in
which a group of corporate officers ignore corporate formalities, totally
dominate and control the corporation for their personal advantage, act in a
self-serving manner, and as a result place the corporation in imminent financial

, 425 S.E.2d at 775-76.
44. Id. at
, 425 S.E.2d at 776.
45. Id. at
, 425 S.E.2d at 776.
46. Id. at
47. See supra text accompanying notes 12-17.
48. 280 S.C. 453, 313 S.E.2d 316 (Ct. App. 1984).
49. 540 F.2d 681 (4th Cir. 1976); see supra note 13 for a list of the eight factors.
50. Sturkie, 280 S.C. at 459, 313 S.E.2d at 319; see supra text accompanying notes 17-18.
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failure. Suppose further that an unwary or unsophisticated creditor or investor
loans to or invests money in the corporation, and the corporation subsequently
fails because of the corporate officers' previous improprieties. Under the
second prong of Sturkie, the officers could escape liability to the creditor or
investor unless they acted in a self-serving manner after the creditor or
investor committed funds to the corporation, regardless of their previous
culpability. However, in DeWitt the Fourth Circuit stated:
[This concept of separate entity is merely a legal theory, "introduced for
purposes of convenience and to subserve the ends of justice," and the
courts "decline to recognize [it] whenever recognition of the corporate
form would extend the principle of incorporation 'beyond its legitimate
purposes and [would] produce injustices or inequitable consequences.'"
Accordingly, "in an appropriate case and in furtherance of the ends of
justice," the corporate veil will be pierced and the corporation and its
stockholders "will be treated as identical."-"
Although courts are hesitant to disregard the corporate entity,52 strict
application of the second prong of the Sturkie test may lead to inequitable
results in certain cases, and thus undermine the policy articulated in Dewitt for
piercing the corporate veil.
A second important concern raised by Peoples Federalis that the decision
impliedly allows a lender to actively participate in the operation and management of a real estate development project without incurring individual liability
to the project's third party creditors. However, the South Carolina Supreme
Court stated in Kennedy v. Columbia Lumber & Manufacturing Co.53 that
sound policy considerations underlie the reluctance to extend liability to
lenders in construction cases. It stated:
The public policy reasons for refusing to impose warranty liability on
a mere lender are myriad. To require every lender to foreclose in order
to shield itself from liability instead of taking a deed in lieu would be
unduly burdensome on the state's judicial and administrative machinery.
The imposition of warranty liability on all lenders/sellers would discourage
lending, and thus, economic growth. Further, it is unduly punitive to
impose potential warranty liability on a lender that is searching for some
way to recover the losses it has suffered due to the default of the
debtor.5 4

51. DeWitt Truck Brokers, Inc., 540 F.2d at 683 (citations omitted).
52. See id.; Sturkie, 280 S.C. at 459, 313 S.E.2d at 319.

53. 299 S.C. 335, 384 S.E.2d 730 (1989).
54. Id. at 340, 384 S.E.2d at 734.
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Similarly, in Roundtree Villas Ass'n v. 4701 Kings Corp." the South
Carolina Supreme Court stated that "[b]oth the lender and the borrower have
a common interest in seeing that the construction company builds a building
free of defects but absent a contract the builder has no common law duty to
protect the lender and the lender has no common law [duty] to protect the
builder."56
However, in Kennedy the court also stated that a lender may be held
liable when: (1) the lender is also a developer; (2) "when the lender becomes
highly involved with construction in a manner that is not normal commercial
practice for a lender"; (3) when the lender is "so amalgamated with the
developer or builder so as to blur its legal distinction"; and (4) when the
lender "forecloses on a developer in the midst of construction, takes title, has
substantial involvement in completing the construction and sells homes."5
Likewise, in Roundtree the South Carolina Supreme Court imposed liability
on a lender for construction defects "when the Lender, in effect, took over the
project and undertook to market the units through a corporation it had created
and when it undertook to repair defects which existed to promote sales.""8
In Peoples Federal the court of appeals held that the involvement of
Peoples in the affairs of the project, after it had sold the stock on August 9,
1985, failed to reach the level of involvement required for liability under
Roundtree.5 9 The facts indicate that Peoples remained active in the project
nonetheless. Dissenting, Judge Gardner noted that Peoples: (1) disbursed large
sums of money to itself; (2) paid itself for various sales of property belonging
to the project; (3) paid $150,000 on a debt of Propps for his corporations; (4)
advanced money to the Partnership after construction on the project stopped
in 1986; (5) communicated with the homeowners association regarding
homeowner concerns about the project; (6) wrote letters to state and federal
officials concerning road construction and paving in the project and seeking
FHA guarantees of loans; (7) made large advances to Justice (a parent
corporation of MBGYC); (8) actively participated in attempting to sell the
project in 1987; (9) throughout 1987, guaranteed payment to subcontractors
employed by the Partnership, and directly paid approximately $1,000,000 to
subcontractors for the Partnership's debts; (10) solicited and received bids to
perform road work, patching, and road extensions on the project through
November 1988; (11) in August 1988, obtained permission from the
bankruptcy court to operate the golf course; (12) in December 1988, formed

55. 282 S.C. 415, 321 S.E.2d 46 (1984).
56. Id. at 422, 321 S.E.2d at 50 (citing Butts'v. Atlanta Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 262 S.E.2d
230 (Ga. Ct. App. 1979)).
57. Kennedy, 299 S.C. at 340-41, 384 S.E.2d at 734 (citations omitted).
58. Roundtree Villas Ass'n, 282 S.C. at 423, 321 S.E.2d at 51 (citing RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 323 (1965)).
59. Peoples Fed. Sav. & LoanAss'n,_ S.C. at _, 425 S.E.2d at 772-73.
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a corporation to control and manage the golf course and obtained a liquor
license for the club; and (13) received income, entered into service contracts,
employed personnel, and actively participated in the maintenance and operation
of the golf club until an employee of Peoples was appointed by the bankruptcy
court as receiver for the project in February 1989.
The majority opinion dismissed many of these involvements as unpersuasive because they "occurred pursuant to [a bankruptcy] court order or after
default and under the default provisions of the mortgage in foreclosure.""
However, Peoples' total involvement in the project both before and after the
August 9, 1985 stock sale seems to reach the level necessary to subject
Peoples to lender liability under the Kennedy and Roundtree tests. In a
detailed analysis, Justice Gardner's dissenting opinion in Peoples concludes
that ACDG established by a preponderance of the evidence that Peoples
engaged in a joint venture with the Partnership and enjoyed control of the
project after August 9, 1985.62
The South Carolina Court of Appeals in Peoples Federal properly
concluded that the lender was not individually liable for debt secured by a
mortgage lien on a real estate development project that the lender initially
financed. The court's application of the existing law, however, may have
impliedly expanded the degree to which a lender may participate in the
operation and management of such a project without subjecting itself to
individual liability.
David J. Parrish

60. Id. at __, 425 S.E.2d at 781-82 (Gardner, J., dissenting).
61. Id. at_, 425 S.E.2d at 771.
62. Id. at _, 425 S.E.2d at 784 (Gardner, J., dissenting).
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